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GREAT EXPECTATIONS
AMERICA AND EUROPE AFTER THE ELECTIONS
Marcin Zaborowski
European  expectations  about  post-Bush  America  are  running  high.  Like  the  rest  of  the  world 
Europeans are gripped by Obamamania. Views on a possible win by John McCain, whilst clearly not 
the preferred option in Europe, are overall positive too.  The truth is that the Europeans can’t wait to 
see  the  back  of  George  W.  Bush  and  that  they  expect  that  things  can  only  get  better  with  his 
successor. American expectations about future co-operation with Europe are also considerable. John 
McCain has already travelled to Europe after securing his nomination and Barack Obama is about to 
come too.  Both McCain and Obama made efforts to reach out to the Europeans to secure their co-
operation on a range of issues, including Afghanistan, Iran and climate change. 
Are things really likely to get better after eight tense and unhappy years in transatlantic relations? 
Indeed it is likely that relations between Europe and the US will improve. Bush never really cared or 
showed much interest in Europe. His foreign policy was ostentatiously unilateral. Both Obama and to a 
larger extent McCain (who unlike Obama referred directly to the EU) speak with respect about Europe. 
Both candidates refer to multilateralism, although, Obama is probably more genuine in this, or rather 
his understanding of multilateralism is closer to that of Europeans. Both Obama and McCain want to 
enter into new and stronger arms control agreements with Russia. Both candidates are ‘greener’ than 
Bush – they do not deny that climate change is happening and both are in favour of introducing 
compulsory caps on greenhouse emissions. Finally, for Poland and other countries that are in favour 
of   Ukraine’s and Georgia’s integration with NATO, it  is  reassuring that both Obama and McCain 
supported NATO’s expansion to these countries. 
As for the Europeans, there has already been a considerable rapprochement with the US, prompted 
by last year’s elections in France. Transatlantic understanding on Iran is now deeper than ever before, 
European contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan have modestly increased and EU-NATO relations could 
be  significantly  revitalised  should  France  fully  rejoin  NATO’s  integrated  military  command,  which 
seems fully plausible.
There are indeed some grounds for optimism, but one needs to be careful not to raise too many 
expectations. For example, those Europeans who expect that America’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict would change will be disappointed. Few expected that McCain would be more sympathetic to 
the Palestinian case, but Obama’s mixed heritage, the fact that his father was Muslim and his middle 
name is Hussein, made some believe that he would pursue a more balanced approach. 
Recently Obama proved them wrong in his speech to the powerful pro-Israeli AIPEC group, which he 
delivered  only  a  few hours  after  winning his  nomination.  In  the speech the  Democratic  nominee 
declared that ‘Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel’ and that it ‘must remain undivided’. He also 
stressed that ‘Israel’s identity as a Jewish state must be preserved’, hence implicitly dismissing the 
Palestinian ‘right of return’. 
Some Europeans believe that  America’s  position on Iran will  change in the way that  would  force 
dialogue on Tehran and defuse tensions in the Gulf. This, again is unlikely. McCain made it clear that 
he would rather bomb Iran than talk to its leaders. Whilst it is true that Obama took the opposite 
position and offered unconditional negotiations with the Iranians, he never ruled out the use of force 
and stressed in his AIPEC speech ‘I will do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon; everything in my power; everything’. So, there is almost no difference between the 
candidates  regarding  harsher  sanctions  against  Tehran,  including  secondary  sanctions  that  the 
Europeans oppose. 
There is  also the issue of  missile  defence installations in  Poland and the Czech Republic.  John 
McCain  fully  supports  Bush’s  plan  to  place  the  installations  in  the  these  countries,  in  fact,  the 
Republican expressed his  support  for  Poland’s  demand to  up the American offer  and strengthen 
security relations between the two countries. However, Obama is far more sceptical. The Democrat 
raised argued that it must be proven that the system is workable before he would decide to continue 
with any further investment in it. Obama also argued that the missile defence system must not ‘divide 
‘new Europe’ from ‘old Europe’, and implying that further negotiations with all European allies were 
needed. It is therefore possible that, in the case of Obama’s victory, the Czechs, and perhaps also the 
Poles,  may  find  themselves  in  the  situation  when  the  costly  deal  they  signed  with  the  Bush 
administration is discontinued. 
The Americans are also down for some disappointments. It is generally expected in Washington that 
with the fresh start, the Europeans would do more to share the burden in Afghanistan and maybe even 
in  Iraq.  This  is  also  unlikely  to  happen.  Both  operations  are  unpopular  in  Europe  and  defence 
establishments are concerned about over-stretching their meagre resources. 
What can be done to preserve a good momentum in transatlantic relations after the elections? Two 
things: first, it is important to reassess expectations in a more realistic manner. The next president will 
be more EU-friendly and more of a multilateralist. If Obama wins, US policy in Iraq is likely to change 
and this would have implications for the level of the US’s presence in Afghanistan. But, no matter who 
wins many policies would remain the same, including the Middle East and East Asia. Americans too 
need to realise the limitations on Europe’s involvement in Afghanistan. It is difficult to maintain, let 
alone increase investment in the war that has been hugely unpopular for years. Without a profound 
change of the nature of this operation this would not alter. 
Second, we must be more open about our differences and about the challenges that lie ahead. One 
can hear  these days in  Europe that  it  is  best  to  avoid the mention of  Afghanistan or  Iraq in our 
discussions with the Americans, because, we do not have much to offer there and the US expects too 
much from us.  Regardless of  whether  the EU can or  cannot offer  anything there,  it  is  clear  that 
relations with the US will not improve just because we pretend that these issues do not exist.
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